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East and West. Orientalism, war
and the colonial present
Jackie Assayag
For at least two hundred years, Western countries have exercized a “benevolent” 
violence through colonization. Advocated in the name of the “civilizing mis-
sion” of the West and inspired by eschatology, this calling held the promise of 
redemption, both for the colonizer and for the colonized. The “war declared on 
terrorism” after the massacre of 9/11 in New York, with the subsequent military 
operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq, revives this tradition of ameliorative inter-
ventionism by carrying on the old orientalist-related topoi. Far from effacing the 
Great Divide between the West and the Rest, the wars of a putatively new type 
reinforce and polarize the division between “civilized” and “barbaric” in the era 
of “globalization”. The unfolding ideology of the American, according to which 
there would no longer be “outside” or “inside”, because no country would now be 
exempt from terrorism, obscures at little cost, but not ineffectually, the “colonial 
present”. What now prevails is a sombre vision of globalization, that of a fight 
to the death between two worlds, extending over all continents, between the 
“Empire of the Good”, incarnated by America, and the “Empire of Evil”, incarna-
ted by Islamic terrorism. But this novelty goes back to schemas that are as old as 
the United States itself, insofar as this self-proclaimed “exceptional”, “unilateral” 
and “providential” “imperial republic” has an idealistic or utopian component 
qualified as “indispensable”. Welcome the the “Wilsonism in boots”!
KEYWORDS: empire, colonialism, war, orientalism, United States of America.
To picture an unknown situation, the imagination borrows
known elements and for that reason fails to picture it. But the
sensitivity, even the most physical, receives like a thunderbolt the
original and long indelible signature of the new event.
Marcel Proust, Albertine Disparue
FOR AT lEAST TWO hUNDRED YEARS, ThE DISTINcTION BETWEEN AN 
“internal”, within which the values of democracy and liberty are propagated, 
and an “external”, which is never ready to accept them, has led Western coun-
tries, like Great-Britain and France, to exercize a “benevolent” violence through 
colonization. The flaunted objective was to “civilize” the native peoples. Such 
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was the “white man’s burden”. Advocated in the name of the civilizing mis-
sion of the West and inspired by eschatology, this calling held the promise 
of redemption, both for the colonizer and for the colonized. But the aim of 
making the “others” better went together with a will to power or crusade 
that imposed at the very least a reform, if not a recasting of their (non) ins-
titutions. This pattern of discourse and practices characterizes colonialism in 
its profound relations with political organizations, also when the latter were 
democratic. There is a fascinating continuity between past and present regar-
ding the previous justifications of colonialism, punishment and empire. For 
those who know the French colonial experience, narrated in the well-known 
movie, Battle of Algiers, for example, it is unbelievable how one is struck by 
similarities with urban warfare in Iraq and Palestine – who is civilian, who is 
a combatant, the suspension of any pretense to legality, the rawness of the 
killing, etc.
The “war declared on terrorism” after the massacre of 9/11 in New York, 
with the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq, revives 
this tradition of ameliorative interventionism by carrying on the old orienta-
list-related topoi; conquests by the British of Afghanistan beginning in 1823, 
of Iraq in 1917-18, of Palestine in 1917. Far from effacing the Great Divide 
between the West and the Rest, the wars of a putatively new type reinforce 
and polarize the division between “civilized” and “barbaric” in the era of “glo-
balization”.
This unquestionably tragic repetition of history is not surprising. That one 
might legitimately have doubts as to the lessons of history does not invalidate 
a brutal observation: the promises of colonialism were always deferred, and 
thus betrayed, by unfulfilled pledges under the pretext of a difference between 
“us” and “them”, understood in terms of ethnic group or of race, of sex or 
of culture. Of course, the difference was disputed, contested and frequently 
denied. And of course, limits or interdictions were overstepped, not to say 
transgressed. But, that natives would have been able to cross frontiers, bring 
dividing walls to fall, expunge here and there a few distinctions of rank or pro-
fession – in a word, would have become “modern” in one or the other registers 
of collective life – did not prevent other differences (or the same) from arising 
(again) in cultures and societies. Who, moreover, can claim to have forgotten 
the voice of the master when it today splutters, “Educate yourselves; civilize 
yourselves; reform yourselves; imitate us, but you will never be like us”; you 
remain “others” – irremediably? The natives will never be modern, unless they 
are civilized, disciplined, administered, kept watch over, evangelized or gui-
ded – in our times, “democratized” manu militari. To enjoy the freedom of the 
moderns, the natives must remodel their society (nation- or state-building) in 
the image of that of their master. Obviously, a few empires were able to pro-
vide varied contexts of coexistence to a diversity of religious, ethnic, racial and 
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cultural groups. But if they were cosmopolitan and sometimes tolerant, it was 
in part because they were not at all democratic.
The unfolding ideology of the American empire, according to which there 
would no longer be “outside” or “inside”, because no country would now be 
exempt from terrorism, obscures at little cost, but not ineffectually, the “colo-
nial present”. Whatever would be the originality of this empire, it is clear that 
the old phantoms, but also the unexorcized spectres of political organizations 
lurking in the past, continue to haunt the imagination of the politically com-
mitted actors as well as of the stunned spectators through the avatars of war 
and peace – the latter also perpetually deferred or travestied. Today, the entre-
preneurs of war have created a desert they call peace, to paraphrase Tacitus.
“cOlD WAR” OR “hOT WAR”?
The world does not exist to provide us with illustrations for our theories. 
conversely, our theories do not engender the world. Nevertheless, intellectuals 
are more than ever fascinated by “performatives” or “self-fulfilling prophecies”. 
In fact, the debate on the “clash of civilizations” introduced by the Orientalist 
pro-sionist Bernard lewis and amplified by the conservative political scientist 
Samuel huntington has transformed religious experiences into political cate-
gories devoid of historicity or of contingency. consequently, this dispute has 
renewed mutatis mutandis the imaginary geographies of the Orient, which for 
that matter are more Middle than Far Eastern.1 Today, the executioner’s crown, 
and that of the victim and the martyr, incontestably goes to the Muslim. his 
fiendish figure has taken the place of the diabolic figure of the communist, 
as enemy within and without.2 It was because the Soviets advocated Marxism 
that the Americans supported Islam, then the Taliban (even if Islamism cannot 
be reduced to cIA manipulation, nor “Talibanism” to an “instrumentalization” 
of the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency).3 While the “reds” are on the way 
of extinction in terms of threat, the “greens with beards” abound and wage 
war everywhere in the world “in the service of Evil”, as is emulously repeated. 
Even though the “United States of Amnesia” did not invent this pattern of 
discourse – France has done it beforehand – their ideologues and politicians 
have greatly contributed to its dissemination by supporting radical Muslim 
movements, simple militants or (more or less powerful) state representatives.
1 The Orientalist did in fact precede the political scientist: “This is no less than a clash of civiliza-
tions – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our judeo-christian 
heritage, our secular present, and the world-wide expansion of both” (lewis 1990: 49).
2 This notion is of course borrowed from Edward Said (1978). It was elaborated by Derek Gregory 
(2004) and Rashid Khalidi (2004), whose works in part inspires our remarks; regarding the image of 
the “good” and “bad” Muslim, cf. the incisive article by Mahmood Mamdani (2002).
3 cf. comments on the aforementioned “Afghan affair” in the article by jackie Assayag (2002b).
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This metamorphosis of cold war enemies has been accompanied by a trans-
formation of the idea of war since the 1980s. While the monopoly of states 
over high technologies of destruction has been established, less complex tech-
nologies have seen an unbridled proliferation. The diffusion of the latter was 
even encouraged by various geopolitical and mercenary interests, by virtue of 
the complicity of private intermediaries or of state representatives who employ 
“revolutionaries” or finance “terrorists”. The individuals or groups engaged in 
warlike activities in Africa, or in certain regions of the Middle East or Asia, are 
no longer modern states, nor traditional regimes, but are rather a new breed 
of voluntary actors called “warlords”. These warlords are in fact the modern 
products of a configuration of global and local forces.4 Their proliferation has 
entailed shifts between categories of war entrepreneurs, terrorists, insurgents 
or those fighting for freedom and ethnic or national liberation, thereby creating 
ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the roles and aims of each. The simulta-
neous reconfiguration of terrorism as a sole global force – the aforementioned 
“Muslim terrorism” – has ultimately subsumed all expressions of violence, pro-
test and vindictiveness under the figure of the “Enemy”. This figure, reviled 
by the politicians in the North, but frequently raised to a hero by a number of 
media in the South, was conceived as a totality before being vanquished in the 
interest of universalism incorporated in the American nation. This focalization 
gave rise to mirror-image effects: the martyrs of Allah henceforth assimilate the 
destruction of the “Western Enemy” into its numerous impious avatars, the 
two centres of which are the United States and Israel.
It seems clear today that the complicated situations linked to war and ter-
ror in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, as well as in Palestine and Iraq, generate 
communitarian imaginations of catastrophe that encourage political, mafia-like 
or eschatological bricolages. The scheming intricacies of the “crusade against the 
axis of evil” provoke aggressive responses, political and cultural, conducive to 
the extension of lawless zones and to the political implementation of cruelty. 
All of them foster in the end an economy of fear or of panic that redesigns 
the architectures of hate and the perimeters of established knowledge and of 
powers, in the West as in the East, in the North as in the South.5
The confrontation of geopolitical cosmologies with the local conceptions of 
ordinary people in an interconnected world largely influenced by mass media 
engenders a great many rival intrigues. The proliferation of expositions fosters 
rumours and the sense of humiliation, nourishes nostalgia as well as resent-
ment, foments fear of conspiracies and fuels the desire for revenge, when it does 
not arouse mobilizing passions according to divergent, if not contradictory, 
4 This is the thesis supported by Olivier Roy (2001) and Nilüfer Göle (2003).
5 For further consideration of this question one can refer to two articles by jackie Assayag (2002a, 
2003).
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interests. The “savage war of peace” – the expression is from Rudyard Kipling 
and refers to the repression carried out in the colonies – has drawn the front 
line in terms of “civilization” or “barbarism”. consequently, a multiplicity of 
actors endeavour to redirect the flow of real or occult powers with a view to 
reviving the war or establishing peace, as much in villages and neighbourhoods 
as in the framework of regions and states, as well as in the midst of transnatio-
nal organizations, notwithstanding their penchant for transparency.6
Above all, this horizon of expectation and desire in societies that are more 
than ever inclined to paranoid crises, in both the South and the North, fosters 
new connections and previously unknown fragmentations on the basis of narra-
tives that favour spatial and mental fictions incorporating history – teleology or 
eschatology. Far from bringing the people of the world closer together, the afore-
mentioned globalization engenders “mutual exoticization” inside frontiers and 
beyond continents: enemies within and without, stereotype against stereotype, 
reciprocal allocation of hostile prejudices, in short, globalization of insecurity 
and of fear (Assayag 2005). Thus the modern colonial imagination imposes itself 
(on the basis of political economy), as the “great [ideological] game” between 
the empires (Russian and British) was orchestrated in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Meyer and Brysac 2002). The colonial present, lying in 
ambush in minds and clinging on to life, has clear territorial bearings: Afghanis-
tan, Iraq, Palestine; either so many political impasses that illustrate a “besieged 
cartography”, that is to say, an ever-changing configuration of borders, or a pro-
duction of topological imaginations that are both disputed and derealizing.7
The use of cultural registers in a way both emblematic and Manichean – the 
Muslim, the Good, the Bad, the Occident, etc. – has thus reduced the long 
history of complex conflicts to an opposition between a unitarian civilization 
and numerous barbarisms; “the first victim of war is truth”, said Winston 
churchill (whose talent in this respect we are chary of contesting). And the 
same holds on the level of inter-state relations, for the complexity of diploma-
tic ties appears to be simplified on (at least) the ideological plane. What are (or 
should be) the relations of states known as “postmodern”, such as the United 
States, japan and the states of Europe, with so-called “modern” states, such 
as china, India or Pakistan? how do matters stand (or how should they) as 
regards the confrontation of these states with the new states in what is called 
the “pre-modern” geopolitical space that covers grosso modo the heterogeneous 
6 On the dialectics of transparency and secret conspiracies in the new world order, cf. the evocative 
collective work edited by harry G. West and Todd Sanders (2003) – largely inspired by the works of 
jean and john comaroff.
7 The derealization is particularly pronounced in Palestine, because one has been given to believe 
for some fifty years that the terror is genetic and not a sociological and political question linked to 
the Israeli occupation of the aforementioned “territories”, this exceptional spectral space that displays 
topologies of power described as “necropolitics” by Achille Mbembe (2003).
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whole of the former Euro-American colonies? One cannot but observe that 
this latter space is from the outset considered (by the postmodern states) 
as the alfresco lair of criminality and the breeding-ground of “internatio-
nal terrorism”, fanatic, fundamentalist and suicidal. Within these opaque 
spaces, risks and dangers grow to the point of threatening the “new world 
order”. Whence, the temptation to treat of the pre-modern chaos according 
to the good old model tried and tested at the time of colonization (while, 
however, the postmodern states reject de jure and de facto the principle of 
colonization). Whence, also, the re-inscription of colonial discourse and 
its hegemonic practices in the regions of central Asia and the Middle East 
by invoking the “exceptional” character of this handful of “rogue states”. 
Designated in this way, these barbarisms are obviously localized in the sou-
thern “grey zones” of the planisphere, where dangers are rampant, where 
the ferocity of uncontrolled fire is concentrated and the risk of generalized 
wars is fuelled.
A number of North Americans today remain convinced that the territorial 
division of the world between an Orient filled with darkness and an enlightened 
Occident persists. But the same people are no less convinced that this oppo-
sition covers a deterritorialized cartography of virtue, one associated with the 
Islamic demon, the other with the judeo-christian Good. A contrario, a judeo-
christian-Muslim nation is a notion that a majority of Americans would find 
un-American. But, would this be different for Europeans?8
Thus, the good geographic conscience proves by definition to be Euro-cen-
tric. The employment of symbolic and imaginary spaces bears witness to this, 
as already suggested, but also the treatment of bodies during conflicts or mas-
sacres, inasmuch as one accepts “the fastidious algebra of infinite justice”, 
according to the formulation of Arundhati Roy (2001: 105-24). The invisi-
bility of bodies and of carnage, the absence of blood and of mutilations are 
striking when the victims are Western, in stark contrast to the catastrophes 
of the Third World, in which the aim (viewed from the West) is precisely to 
produce the most terrifying details: the veritable horror occurs there, but not 
here! The reckoning of the local people or the civilians killed during military 
interventions is always approximate, if not evaded, whereas in the case of Wes-
terners, it is seen to be exact;9 as if the massacres of populations of the South 
would only kill anonymous masses, as if the carnages would involve only a 
sub-humanity. There, moreover, wars have no witnesses.
8 This idea is brilliantly developed by john Bornman (2003).
9 General colin Powell admitted that he had “no idea” as to the number of Iraqis killed and that he 
would not try to find out. Greenpeace estimates that 70.000 to 115.000 Iraqi soldiers and 72.500 to 
93.000 Iraqi civilians were killed during the conflict till 2004 (Gregory 2004: 168). An independent 
group of experts based in london, the Body Project, estimates that the number of civilians killed in the 
conflict was (in September 2004) between 11.783 and 13.802.
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The intrinsic inequality of the human species is also observed in the use of the 
category of the Universal: the attack against America was thus interpreted as an 
attack against humanity itself. Without wanting to deny the monstrous charac-
ter of the attac in New York, we will note that a similar judgement never applies 
to victims of large-scale massacres in the countries of the South; the weak echo 
caused by the announcement of the genocide that was taking place in Rwanda in 
1993 bears witness to this, or the indifference towards the “tropical genocides” 
perpetrated in Rwanda during colonization in the nineteenth century.10 It is 
indeed unto the death that the nomos of humanity and the axiological degree 
reached by cultures is measured. Short of the starchy declarations on the progress 
or the (reconciled) end of history (in the manner of Francis Fukuyama), and of 
the allegories of the American hobbesian Mars and the European Kantian Venus 
(according to Robert Kagan), there is no choice but to accept the international 
division of labour and destinies: the burgeoning of the processes of “civilization” 
in the North, the reign of unmitigated “brutalization” in the South.11
NATION, EMPIRE, GlOBAlIzATION
While North America is the main actor in the “preventive” state terror exer-
cised exclusively in what is termed the “Third World”, and consequently with 
a near-general indifference, it is important to realize that the employment of 
the term “war” (in the declarations of the responsible American politicians) 
is new. Previously, when governments announced that their duty was “to era-
dicate terrorists”, they took care not to speak of war – a notion linked to the 
dignity of nation-states and the relations they entertained –, jus ad bellum as 
well as jus in bello; as if they forbid that the “terrorists” be represented, or that 
they represent themselves, as enemies, considering that it was only a matter 
of “criminals”. how, in fact, can one declare war on corrupted civilians, fana-
tic or anarchistic militants, planters of bombs, fundamentalists or presumed 
nihilists? Even at the time of the worst colonial violence, one spoke of “main-
taining order”, one organized “police operations”, one “cleansed” and justified 
this “purging” in the name of “pacification”. It is true that these acts of terror 
were then of limited scale, at least in the mother country: the arm of the weak 
and poor (while state and economic terror is the arm of the strong).
10 One can refer to the work of synthesis by Enzo Traverso (chap. 5: 2002) and to the enlightening 
investigation conducted by Mike Davis (2001). This idea is also developed in an article by Veena Das 
(2002). We intentionally leave aside the philosophical discussion of the definition (and the localiza-
tion) of the “good life”, undoubtedly Aristotelian, but given the present circumstances essential from 
the point of view of the urban paradigm that the capitalist city of New York today constitutes.
11 The interest of the works of the historian George Mosse is to have done away with this distinction 
by retracing the rise in power of the “culture of war”, which reached its acme during the first world 
conflict of 1914-18; on all of these questions, one can refer to jackie Assayag (2004a; 2004b).
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The warlike outlook that the American empire allows itself, as a privileged, 
indeed unique, form is in fact due to its foundation and its history. Its foun-
dation, because the national construction of the United States is based on the 
denial and extermination of the Indian populations: inaugurated by the famous 
war against the Pequots, who were annihilated by the Quakers in New England 
from 1637-38.12 Its history, because the United States became a hegemonic 
power in and through wars. First, the internal war, called the War of Succession, 
the first modern conflict of the industrial type. Then, the two World Wars, as 
well as the uninterrupted series of local wars and military interventions (from 
Korea to Afghanistan and Iraq, by way of lebanon, the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, 
libya, Panama, Barbados, chile, Nicaragua, etc.).13 These wars, described as 
more or less “low intensity”, aimed at supporting subversion through over-
throw (or sometimes support) of governments in the framework of the rivalry 
with the USSR during and after the “cold War”. In this period, cartography 
traced a series of borders between “civilization” and “barbarism”, well beyond 
the East-West division, the inscription of which acquires performative, Mani-
chean and often destructive force. let us also mention the arsenal of economic 
sanctions devoid of scruples: blockades, embargoes, punitive aerial attacks, 
army operations, etc. This should remind us that the United States, apart from 
its participation in the establishment of peace in Europe at the time of the two 
World Wars, has contributed to the implantation of state terror in the world 
system, for the benefit of its imperial interests.
The attack of 11 September 2001 was immediately interpreted by a great 
many North Americans as a myth of destruction of America by an “Enemy” 
both internal and external, widespread but invisible, tentacular and elusive. 
lead by the press and media, whose function was to stabilize the figure of the 
“Enemy”, the community conspired in the “therapeutic patriotism”.14 It would 
be a question of itemizing the victims of a massacre conceived following the 
example of a genocidal eschatology in a country in which one deliberately 
represented the formation of the nation as an innocent process of self-produc-
tion, free from violence and immune from contact with other cultures. After 
this event, the subjective force that bore the Americans in the desire for venge-
ance and war developed around the flag and the army.
If the United States spends every year for its military budget more than 
Russia, china, France, England and Germany together, it is because a sizeable 
number of North Americans are convinced that the interests of the homeland 
coincide with the “Good”, including that of all the populations of the world, 
12 On the genocidal foundation of what was not yet the United States, one can refer to the works of 
Ward churchill (1997) and David Stannard (1992). On the foundation myths, cf. Élise Marienstras 
(1976).
13 For an inventory, refer to the works of Noam chomsky, for example, 2001.
14 The notion is borrowed from the “ethnography of the media” by carol Gluck (2003).
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which sooner or later derive benefits and redemption. Unable to govern them-
selves properly, these countries need a (colonial) guardianship distinguishing 
the “occupied” and the “occupiers” so as to integrate the dominated in the 
world current of the American way of life. This imposition of protectorship is 
all the more justified because, in distinction to the British Empire (under a 
monarchic regime), the Americans discipline the colonized alone by the “vir-
tue of their race” and according to their “perfect liberal democracy”, to use the 
words of Woodrow Wilson.15 This translation of Fordism into international 
relations explains the circle of interventions so as to topple the “rogue states” 
with a view to reconfiguring them in the image of America: liberal and trans-
parent, mercantile and democratic, prosperous and conquering. Such is the 
“manifest destiny” of the United States in world history.
Only the blindness of certain neo-conservatives in face of the complexity 
of social life, as well as their ignorance of the damage caused by the conflicts 
of nation and empire in the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
has made possible the vision according to which the occupation of a country 
by force and the subjugation of its population would lead up to the establish-
ment of legality and of social order in the administration of a nation-state in 
the process of reconstruction (Masson 2004). Thus, the idea that the societies 
of the South belong to a “permanent state of exception” endures in the thou-
ght of the occupier.16
hYPERPOWER OR “EMPIRE lITE”?
The invasion of Afghanistan, and even more so that of Iraq, by the North 
American army has provoked a debate as to the pertinence of the notion of 
“empire” in characterizing the military, economic, political and cultural powers 
of the United States. The anarcho-Marxist work by Michael hardt and Antonio 
Negri has thus proposed a postmodern reading of the (post-Roman) American 
empire under the impact of various mechanisms of transnational regulation 
that, in particular, consist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).17 
But to once again describe this empire in terms of hegemonic networks and 
15 Woodrow Wilson declared in 1901 that: “No Nation can live any longer to itself and the West 
would necessarily dominate the East. The East is to be opened and transformed, whether we will it or 
no; the standards of the West are to be imposed on it”, cited by julian Go (2003: 18).
16  On the “state of exception”, cf. Gorgio Agamben (2001); Walter Benjamin had already learned 
this lesson, but “against the grain”, in his Theses on the Philosophy of History: “The tradition of the oppres-
sed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”.
17 To this end, the authors indulge in the mysticism of the sublimation of classes in a deterritoriali-
zed, yearning and subversive “multitude”, conceived of in a “Deleuzo-Spinozist” manner; this perspec-
tive made the book the Bible of the anti-globalists.
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collusion with transnational companies transfixes North American realities by 
amalgamating its methods of intervention abroad, which should however be 
distinguished: imperialism (that is to say, intervention in a state without really 
changing the government); hegemony (to the purpose of establishing the rules 
of the game that the other actors must respect); colonialism (in the perspective 
of governing the internal affairs of a subordinate state).18
Be that as it may, the notion entertained by responsible North American 
politicians of the role of territories that have fallen under its empire sub-
sequent to embarking on the “crusade for the Absolute Good against the 
Absolute Evil” is not congruent with a direct occupation or with a long-term 
installation. As shown by the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the relation crea-
ted with these vassal and disarmed entities is rather like a client-state relation 
on the basis of a network of both limited and largely instrumentalized sove-
reignty. This regime is in many respects like the old notion of “indirect rule” 
in the context of the British Empire or of the republica de indios in Spanish 
America. It can be reasonably thought that the American empire could add a 
series of such client states in the years to come. But this accumulation would 
not constitute an imperial project in the nineteenth-century sense, that is, 
a relatively stabilized and accepted order (although the empire was in fact 
always fragmented, disputed and under tension),19 nor would it reproduce the 
type of relations that the United States had in the past with the shah in Iran, 
or with Pinochet in chile.
It is conceivable that the United States will utilize its vast resources to orga-
nize with greater success the flexibility of global geopolitics. But, on looking 
at history, it is open to doubt that the coercive temptation to tie this system 
together under the name of “global liberal democracy” would lead to the plan-
ned result. More probably, a system of consensual domination will be imposed 
in which the North America’s coercive power will be selectively used with a 
view to projects that will give rise to a wider legitimacy and which will be lar-
gely supported by local, regional or multilateral institutions. Of course, this 
“empire” will always be a source of tension, of disorder and violence. But it 
could be organized here or there in a flexible manner and on a reduced scale 
of hegemony with which the client states could be variably associated so as to 
produce better results.
Michael Ignatieff has described (in an uncritical manner) the North 
American project as an “imperialism lite”, a hegemony without colonies, 
a global sphere of influence relieved of the weight of direct administration 
18 cf. the in-depth historical syntheses on empire by Frederik cooper (2003; 2004), Emmanuel 
Saada (2004) and julian Go (2003). let us also mention the concept of “non-global hegemon” of Paul 
Kagan because it remains very much en vogue in the United States.
19 Regarding these dimensions characteristic of colonial empires, cf. Frederik cooper and Ann laura 
Stoller (1997).
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and of the risks entailed in the day to day management of politics.20 Thus 
the “burden” of Kipling would have become lighter in passing from England 
to the United States, for it is true that the task and the message have in 
the meantime changed. Today, it is a question of conducting a “war against 
terrorism”. To declare war on individuals and forces liberated from existing 
legal institutions, or eluding ethical control, proves to be an interminable 
task. The actors involved in this type of violence in fact freely determine 
the arms and the targets of their choice, independently of state constraint. 
contrary to war according to clausewitz, the “crusade against terrorism” 
will not be able to triumph, for it is “the continuation of political absence 
by other means”.21 Because of this lack of global politics and because of the 
deficiency of a world political authority, the multiplication of violent con-
flicts can be expected.
De facto, one has fallen back on the war against “rogue” or “delinquent” 
states. The declared imperial will is to destroy them with a view to reforming 
them according to the advantages of liberal capitalism and of democracy for 
the benefit of the greatest number. The intention is even to impose the respect 
for human rights and related cosmopolitan values in the (“foreign” and “hos-
tile”) populations, whose major concerns manifestly belong to another order. 
The concurrent state establishment of the market economy and democratic 
ideals by means of military force should make nation-building possible and to 
pacify the “civil society” by ensuring at the same time economic development 
and growth. Knowing, however, that the Star-Spangled Banner will wave only 
so long as it is necessary to introduce a free market and the reign of liberty. The 
hyperpower thus allows itself but a parenthetical empire.
But, how to be a “minimum empire” when one maintains seven hundred and 
fifty military bases in one hundred and thirty countries, besides numerous pro-
grammes of “secret intervention”, “silent operation” and “police protection”, as 
well as plans for “virtual bases” that encircle the globe? The only possibility is 
to temporarily and flexibly implement it, or to enunciate it through disavowal 
manoeuvres: an empire denied or a denial of empire. Thus the United States 
sells the notion of empire by offering a cut-price colonization: the responsible 
Americans now only plan interventions that are as brief as possible, in other 
words, a “McOccupation”. however, this furtive and hardly reliable concept of 
imperial authority will always be perceived as an invasion and a predation by 
the “occupied”, apart from the fact that such a volatile colonization proves to 
be full of danger for the “occupiers” as well as the “occupied”.
20 The project of “nation-building lite” conceived by Michael Ignatieff (2003) was adopted by the 
American administration, on one side, the Pentagon, and the neo-conservatives, on the other.
21 We borrow this “Weberian inversion” from jean Baudrillard, but such as developed by zygmunt 
Bauman (2002).
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The idea of a “lite” empire also finds its bearings in the representation 
according to which such a regime would remove all contradictions, would abo-
lish the distinctions between “outer” and “inner”, would efface the borders 
between “outside” and “inside”. “There is no longer an outside”, write Michael 
hardt and Antonio Negri. In their view, “The modern dialectic of internal and 
external has been replaced by an interplay of degrees ans intensities, hybridities 
and artifice”. Similarly, the sociologist zygmunt Bauman contends that 9/11 
September has made it clear that there is no outside”. hence, the negative 
corollary posed by a number of observers: with European unification and the 
emergence of the new world “governance”, guided by the enlightened ideas of 
opening outwards and interdependence, the mutual vulnerability of all coun-
tries is growing, also on American territory. Thus, we would have entered into 
international relations of the “postmodern” type. But, who does not perceive 
that 9/11 “a deferred effect of the ‘cold War’, the genealogy of which can be 
traced back to the support of the mujahiddin by the United States against the 
intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan” (Derrida, in Borradori 2003: 
92)? And who could contest that this event experienced as a cataclysm, follo-
wed by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, apart from the interminable conflict 
in Palestine, has raised the veil of antagonism between the “colonizer” and 
the “colonized”, radicalized the political positions of each of the entrenched 
camps and, finally, has deepened the Manichean geography between “us” and 
“them”?
ThE AVATARS OF ThE WelTgeisT
The critique of the perverse effects of political idealism and other eschatolo-
gical engineering of vast magnitude no longer need be undertaken after the 
analyses of G. W. F. hegel, on the Terror, or Karl Popper concerning the waves 
of contemporary social utopias of “Platonic” inspiration. It must however be 
observed that the demiurgic will to reconstruct (without mediation) “other” 
societies (or “of others”) to the purpose of improving them is periodically 
proposed on the political agendas of the great powers and empires. That is to 
say, a contrario, how much the question of the individual or collective, real or 
fantasized adversary – beyond the classic question of adversity – hovers over 
the history of societies in this interminable twentieth century rich in radical 
and final solutions.
In fact, numerous were the states that designated the adversary as “enemy” 
with a view to hounding it to better destroy it. And scarcely fewer were those 
that categorized and then bureaucratized the enemy par excellence to the pur-
pose of annihilating it. The declaration of war in the abstract form of a thea-
trical or media-staged seizure of the enemy by the state, or rather by the group 
or class representing it, lent an emblematic shape to this Other – intimate 
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and insidious, protean and ubiquitous, inhuman or evil – to the point that its 
annihilation proves to be an endless process. The relentless pursuit of an elu-
sive enemy, elusive because equivocal or caricatured, augurs for a war without 
end.22
The question of treating the adversary as an “enemy” haunts nations as 
well as empires. It obsesses them all the more as the response to this question 
is in limbo: what to do with a person who withholds his assent, announces 
his disagreement or remains indifferent? Must he be treated as a foreigner, 
the hostis, or is he to be considered as an enemy? And what treatment is to be 
reserved for the enemy? For the philosopher, the question of hostility tends to 
go together with that of difference and identity: it constitutes the blind spot 
of the future of (in)humanity. But, for the historian and anthropologist, the 
figure of the enemy is a red thread, or rather the barbed wire, that makes it 
possible to locate the territories of otherness and to delimit the imaginary spa-
ces of civilization or barbarism, when it does not serve to protect the geogra-
phy from terrors about everywhere in the world. carl Schmitt, master that he 
was of the “friend-enemy” distinction, did not fail to inquire as to the contem-
porary enigma of “this being, the foreigner, and such that ultimately conflicts 
with him would be possible that cannot be resolved, neither by a set of general 
norms established in advance, nor by the sentence pronounced by a reputed 
uninvolved and imperial third party” (Schmitt 1972: 67); thinly-veiled praise 
of the “state of exception”.
The American strategy, which consists in representing the United States as 
a “universal nation” articulating global values and combating for this reason 
the “enemies of civilization”: terrorists, tyrants or barbarians, has similarities 
with the hegelian version of the Weltgeist; and this all the more so as Meso-
potamia is one of the cradles of civilization.23 At the beginning of the ninete-
enth century, hegel had seen the Weltgeist pass by in the figure of Napoléon, 
that product of the French Revolution, mounted on a horse at the time of his 
entrance into the town of jena. Some one hundred and fifty years later, The-
odor Adorno perceived it, not on horseback, but “on the wings of a headless 
rocket” – an allusion to the V-2s of hitler, robot-bombs that, like Fascism, 
“allied the most advanced technical perfection with the most total blindness”. 
At the beginning of the third millennium, the American neo-Straussians think 
22 As shown by Omar Bartov (1998), the confusion between executioner and victim is at the heart of 
the destructive energy characteristic of modern massacres, which are deployed in an imaginary universe 
that includes every individual in an interminable cycle of devastation and murders.
23 let us call to mind that this is not the first time that the bombs of British and American powers 
have rained down on Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, regions that the Muslims henceforth think of as 
three connected invasions. The model of the power of India under the British was applied to Mesopo-
tamia. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, lord curzon, thus proclaimed that “the question of petrol had 
nothing to do with the occupation of this province…”.
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to incarnate the Weltgeist because the United States army – the instrument of 
the race of lords fighting against the wretches of the earth – has struck down 
the enemy and smashed the “Axis of Evil” blazoned by Saddam hussein, the 
former ally of the West against Iran in the process of “Khomeinization”.
Inspired by the neoreaganian cocktail of internationalist idealism and Real-
politik concocted by the conflicting alliance of messianic neo-conservatives 
(Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle), of confederate fundamentalists (George W. 
Bush, Karl Rove), of imperial nationalists (Richard cheney, Ronald Rumsfeld) 
and realist traditionalists (condoleeza Rice, colin Powel),24 the victory of the 
“coalition” in Iraq would have justified the use of the armed forces to remodel 
wide regions where “the damned of the earth” for the greater part live; this 
dynamic of four schools, thinking diversely about the conflict between virtue, 
liberty and corruption, is the American “Machiavellian moment”, according 
to the typology of john Pockock.25 But the consequences on the “ground” and 
for the concerned populations of this “Wilsonism in boots” – the formulation 
is from Pierre hassner (2003: 199) – allows one to think that it is neverthe-
less a question of a Pyrrhic victory: the promises of modernization through 
colonization have been systematically deferred and always supplanted by the 
ontological difference between “us” and “them” – tertium non datur.
What now prevails is a sombre vision of globalization, that of a fight to the 
death between two worlds, extending over all continents, between the “Empire 
of the Good”, incarnated by America, and the “Empire of Evil”, incarnated by 
Islamic terrorism. But this novelty goes back to schemas that are as old as the 
United States itself, insofar as this self-proclaimed “exceptional”, “unilateral” 
and “providential” “imperial republic” has an idealistic or utopian component 
qualified as “indispensable”. It remains that today the (Texan) sheriff is no 
longer reluctant26 to trigger pre-emptive strikes in order to eradicate Evil in the 
name of the Good and of the universal empire – it’s all one.
cNRS, Maison Française, Oxford
24 One can refer to the book by Pierre hassner and justin Vaïsse (2003) that deciphers the foreign 
policy debates in the United States.
25 For the presentation of the four “schools” of foreign politics, those of Alexander hamilton, Woo-
drow Wilson, Thomas jefferson and Andrew jackson, which the position of George W. Bush con-
founds, cf. Marc-Olivier Pardis (2004).
26 We twist the formulation (“the reluctant sheriff”) of the isolationist ideologue Richard haass.
EAST AND WEST. ORIENTAlISM, WAR AND ThE cOlONIAl PRESENT • 267
REFERENCES
AGAMBEN, Gorgio, 1997, Homo sacer. le Pouvoir souverain et la Vie Nue. Paris, Seuil (1ére éd. 
Ital. 1995).
ASSAYAG, jackie, 2002a, “De l’équilibre de la terreur à la planète des risques”, la Revue des 
Deux Mondes, 2, Février, pp. 49-54.
—, 2002b, “Ethnie, nation, état, empire. � propos des   tâlebân et de l’Afghanistan”, 
l’Homme, 162, pp. 291-308.
—, 2003, “Visions fragmentées. Géopolitique des études régionales et mondialisation�,         
Critique, lIX, 679, pp. 946-956.
—, 2004a, “leçon de ténèbres. Violence, terreur, génocides”,       les Temps Modernes, 626, pp. 
275-304.
—, 2004b, “la face cachée de la modernité. Anthropologie et génocides”,          l’Homme, 170, 
pp. 231-244.
—, 2005, la Mondialisation Vue d’Ailleurs. l’inde Desorientée. Paris, Seuil (coll. «la couleur 
des Idées�).
BARTOV, Omar, 1998, “Defining ennemies, mmaking victims: germans, jews, and the holo-
caust”, The American Historical Review, 103, 3, 771-816.
BAUMAN, zygmunt, 2002, “living and dying in the planetary frontier-land”, em society 
Under siege. cambridge, Polity, 87-117.
BORNMAN, john, 2003, “Is the United States Europe’s other?”, American ethnologist, 30, 
4, 487-492.
BORRADORI, Giovanna, 2003, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas 
and Jacques Derrida. chicago, chicago University Press.
chOMSKY, Noam, 2001, 11 septembre. Autopsie des Terrorismes. Paris, le Serpent à Plumes.    
chURchIll, Ward, 1997, A little Matter of genocide. Holocaust and Denial in the America. San 
Francisco, city lights Books.
cOOPER, Frederick, 2003, “Modernizing colonialism and the limits of empire”, items & 
issues (social science Research Council) 4, 4, 1-9.
—, 2004, “Empire multiplied. A review essay”,      Comparative study of society and History, 
247-272.
cOOPER, Frederik and Ann laura Stoller, 1997, Tensions of empire: Colonial Cultures in a 
Bourgeois World. Berkeley, University of california Press.
DAS, Vena, 2002, “Violence and translation”, Anthropological Quarterly, 1, 105-112.
DAVIS, Mike, 2001, late Victorian Holocaust, el Nino Famines and the Making of the Third 
World. New York-london, Verso.
GlUcK, carol, 2003, “le 11 septembre. Guerre et télévision”, Annales Hss, 58, 1, 135-162.
GO, julian, 2003, “American colonial empire: the limit of power’s reach”, items & issues 
(social science Research Council) 4, 4, 18-23.
GÖlE, Nilüfer, 2003, “close encounter: islam, modernity and violence”, em Understanding 
suicides Terrorism, <www.interdiscines.org/terrorism>.
GREGORY, Derek, 2004, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, irak. Malden-Oxford-
-carlton, Blackwell.
hARDT, Michael and Antonio Negri, 2001, empire. Paris, Éditions de l’Exil.
hASSNER, Pierre, 2003, la Terreur et l’empire. la Violence et la Paix ii. Paris, Seuil (coll. “la 
couleur des Idées”).
268 • jAcKIE ASSAYAG etnográfica • maio de 2007 • 11 (1): 253-269
hASSNER, Pierre, e justin Vaïsse, 2003, Washington et le Monde. Dilemme d’une superpuissance. 
Paris, Éditions Autrement.
hUNTINGTON, Samuel, 1993, “The clash of civilization?”, Foreign Affairs, 72, 2, 22-49.
IGNATIEFF, Michael, 2003, empire lite: Nation-Building in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. 
Toronto, Penguin.
KhAlIDI, Rashid, 2004, Ressurecting empire. Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in 
the Middle east. Beacon Press.
lEWIS, Bernard, 1990, “The roots of muslim rage”, Atlantic Monthly, 26, 45-589.
MADANI, Mahmood, 2002, “Good muslims, bad muslims: a political perspective on culture 
and terrorism”, American Anthropologist, 104, 766-775.
MARIENSTRAS, Elise, 1976, les Mythes de Fondation de la Nation Américaine. Paris, Maspéro. 
MASSON, john D., 2004, “Guerre d’Irak et guerre culturelle, les ‘pieux mensonges’ néo-
-conservateurs”, Critique 683, 191-208.
MBEMBE, Achille, 2003, “Necropolitics”, Public Culture, 15, 11-40.
MEYER, Karl, and Shareen Blair Brysac, 2002, Tournament of shadows: The geat game and the 
Race for empire in Central Asia. Washingron, counterpoint.
PARDIS, Marc-Olivier, 2004, “la culture politique américaine, au singulier et au pluriel”, 
esprit, Août-Septembre, 114-128.
ROY, Arundhati, 2001, Power Politics. cambridge, MA, South End Press.
ROY, Olivier, 2001, l’islam Mondialisé. Paris, Seuil (coll. “la couleur des idées”).
SAADA, Emmanuelle, 2003, “The history of lessons: power and rule in imperial formation”, 
items & issues (social science Research Council) 4, 4, 10-17.
SAID, W. Edward., 1991, Orientalism. london, Penguin Books (1.st ed. 1978).
SchMITT, carl, 1972, la Notions de Politiques. Paris, calmann-levy.
STANNARD, David, 1992, American Holocaust. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
TRAVERSO, Enzo, 2002, la Violence Nazi. Une généalogie européeenne  . Paris, la Fabrique 
Éditions.
WEST, harry G., e Todd Sanders (éd.), 2003, Transparency and Conspiracy. ethnographies of 
suspicion in the New World Order. Durham & london, Duke University Press.
zIzEK, Slavoj, 2002, Welcome to the Desert of the Real!. New York-london, Verso.
EAST AND WEST. ORIENTAlISM, WAR AND ThE cOlONIAl PRESENT • 269
Este e Oeste. Orientalismo, guerra




Ao longo de pelo menos duzentos anos, os países ocidentais exercitaram uma violência 
“benevolente” através do colonialismo. Advogado, à época,  em nome de uma “missão 
civilizadora” do Ocidente e inspirado na escatologia, este chamamento invocava a pro-
messa da redenção, tanto para o colonizador como para o colonizado. A declaração de 
“guerra ao terrorismo” depois do massacre de 11 de Setembro em Nova Iorque, e as 
subsequentes operações militares no Afeganistão e no Iraque, revive esta tradição de 
“intervencionismo melhorador” ao transportar os velhos topoi orientalistas. longe de 
erradicar a Grande Divisão entre o West e o Rest, as novas guerras reforçam e polarizam 
a divisão entre “civilizados” e “bárbaros” numa era de “globalização”. A crescente ideo-
logia dos norte-americanos, segundo a qual não haveria mais lugar para o “fora” e o 
“dentro” porque nenhum país está a salvo do terrorismo, ofusca superficialmente (mas 
também com eficácia) a “contemporaneidade colonial”. Prevalece hoje uma visão som-
bria da globalização, a visão de uma guerra mortífera entre dois mundos, estendendo-se 
por todos os continentes e encarnada pelos Estados Unidos da América e pelo “Impé-
rio do Mal”, encarnado pelo terrorismo islâmico. No entanto, esta nova ordem não 
faz senão recuperar velhos esquemas, tão antigos como os próprios Estados Unidos da 
América, na medida em que esta autoproclamada “república imperial”, “providencial”, 
“excepcional” e “unilateral” incorpora uma componente idealística e utópica encarada 
como “indispensável”. Bem-vindos ao “wilsonismo com botas”!
PAlAVRAS-chAVE: império, colonialismo, guerra, orientalismo, Estados Unidos da Amé-
rica.
